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Requiem
Reflections on the Analytic-Continental Divide

Babette Babich

I’d like to begin by thanking Shane Ewegen for this invitation — it is grand to be back, of
course, it always is (although without Shane I cannot imagine having been invited back
otherwise). Although I haven’t lost my admiration for the department at Boston College,
it is manifestly very different from what it was when I was studying here. I say this
because it is obvious and because it is a point to which I will return in my conclusion. I
am also grateful to Shane, because it also does not go without saying that I’d be invited to
a discussion on the distinction between continental and analytic philosophy and this is
true although I have been writing quite vociferously about this topic for more than twenty
years. 1 That’s 2 long and lonely decades in print. And I have to underline this, because
most other people who write on the same topic manage to do so without engaging
anything I might have said, though on occasion I might get a nod in passing that cheerily
manages to miss the substance of my contributions.
So what? So one might/could say? Happens all the time. No biggie.
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That is true. I am interested in tracing what follows from this? For here things become
more interesting than the (perforce) empty gripe that one is not read: a common fate in
philosophy and one has both marvelously good company — Hume, Schopenhauer,
Nietzsche — and numerous and rightly unknown fellow travelers. For by lumping these
the analytic and the continental together as mainstream scholarship wishes to do (useful
as this lumping is for its own purposes), this same mainstream practices not scholarship
but political division. That is: suppression, snuff tactics, the internecine war about which
Kant — who did not suffer from it — and subsequently Derrida — who suffered
somewhat at the start until going on to enjoy wide academic popularity while still being
excluded from the academy as such, rather like Žižek these days — both wrote with
regard to the academy). 2
For better or for worse,
there is a method to
academic

exclusions.

And I am grateful to
Elizabeth

Schüssler-

Fiorenza for noting this,
and

underlining

the

effects of the same in her
recent
“Celebrating

essay,
Feminist

Work by Knowing It.” I
want to underline the strikingly elegant challenge of what appears to be a simple
expedient — becoming familiar with an academic colleague’s work — as she raises this
very point in this very context. 3
Merely by failing to mention alternate observations, scholars are able (this is how it is
done) to define the problem (just and only) on their own terms, solve things (just and
only) as they see them and if they have colleagues who do the same, this is the end of the
story or the beginning of a research programme.
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For my own part, I prefer not to join such programmes but to reflect on them just to the
extent that as I conceive it, this is what critical reflection and philosophy of philosophy
and philosophy of science and technology and media, etc., is (or should be) all about.
Thus I bring in things other academics like not to engage because I talk about the political
as it affects us directly, as academics, in our philosophical lives. I talk about the
economic, raise uncomfortable (for whom?) cui bono issues and so on. These are applied,
practical issues that philosophers sometimes like to pretend inapplicable, supposing one
might address the distinction by recommending that it be abolished (cue the absence of
women on conference programs) or more commonly by simply insisting that it isn’t a
distinction that makes a difference anyway, or that it’s nowadays (this is the get-with-it
argument, cue feminism again) another story altogether.

Old news you might say.

We are all so very beyond that now.

But as with feminism itself (here I am
thinking of Mary Daly and her reputation, by
contrast

with

theologians,

like

other

Boston

College

my

teacher,

Bernard

Lonergan, but others also come to mind), as
with communism even, this is a nice idea
that has yet to be put in practice.

Here I begin my discussion of analytic and continental philosophy by noting that, as of
the present date (and I am fairly long in the tooth of my own career as a continental
philosopher, and I note that it was old when I got here in 1980), although analytic
philosophy counts as a “tradition,” and is named as such, the continental tradition does
not rate such a denomination. 4
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What is continental philosophy? the analysts say, whereby they propose to answer that it
is anything that has to do with one or other historical figure (history of philosophy is a
code word for analytic approaches to continental philosophy in nuce) and proceed to staff
whatever positions there may be from their own ranks.
Analytic philosophy, be it note, has gained no small part of its academic capital from the
openness or pluralism that is characteristic of its traditional, i.e., so-called classical
continental colleagues — by which I mean to refer to the tradition prior to its analytic or
appropriated sense as it is understood say, at Harvard or Oxford or Toronto or Chicago or
UCSD and even Stanford and so on), the same openness also shared by analytic
philosophy’s Pragmatist colleagues,
who have also long hoped to be invited
to the philosophical table as well. 5 This
was made clear some years ago by an
important but unappreciated book by
Bruce Wilshire and this too, although it
is complicated by the fact that most
pragmatists

share

an

analytic

formation, I will return to below.
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Somewhat, but not too recently, the Society for Phenomenology and Existential
Philosophy (which is duly open to continental philosophers analytic and not) finally
posted a kind of informal, alternative guide to Leiter’s Philosophical Gourmet Report
(and it is also true that it is a little silly to have to note that there has been no serious
alternative to date apart from such desultory attempts begun and abandoned by grad
students and young professors along the way of their careers) and this is why some say
that Leiter simply plays the internet [brilliantly] and we play along, [helplessly one is left
to assume]. 6
I am fond of regarding the Leiter report as a kind of cheat card for fans of the Rutgers
philosophy department just to the extent that these days Leiter seems to have gotten over
his lionization of Michigan by means of a personal move to the University of Chicago,
not in philosophy, of course, but in law. Leiter — who has attacked me personally online
but seemed to have not a word to say to me (or about me) when we met in person —
tracks philosophy moves with a passion only avarice or a confusion with baseball trading
(players or cards) can sustain. But just this is the kind of social media effect that ensures
the interest of his colleagues, favored or unfavored.
Now the APA itself long ago sanctioned or more accurately said ‘disapproved’ of
Leiter’s report (because, to be sure, he simply made it up in the first place) 7 just as SPEP
itself was none too happy about it and this is because one of the things (social media fans
take note) that Leiter liked to do was not merely to declare one philosophy department
better than another but insisted upon listing the best places to do continental philosophy
— by which notion Leiter himself meant not reading Gadamer but something like the sort
of thing he himself did when he himself read Nietzsche. 8
And many undergraduate and many more graduate students and quite a few professors of
philosophy took the list to heart. Students (and professors) like lists, especially lists on
the internet (this was before Twitter and Facebook where they still like them) and they
like positive, unambiguous statements even more. The Leiter report provided them with
such non-ambiguous lists (i.e., the truth) and a lot of “fun” stuff, meaning mockery of
others, just to spice things up.
I call this testosterone philosophy. So and so is a jerk. I haven’t read his/her stuff but I
shouldn’t have to because I don’t understand it and it sounds wrong anyway.
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And we’ll come back to that.
The larger problem for the most recent online fit of aggression was, as it turns out, SPEP,
which will have its 2011 meeting in just a few weeks. For it had transpired that Linda
Martín Alcoff (Hunter College, Grad Center, CUNY) and Paul Taylor (Penn State) and
William Wilkerson (University of Alabama-Hunstville) had collated an alternative guide
to the Leiter guide, a guide — because I like to think of this in German — to the guider
guide. Now none of the men were attacked by name and only one aspect of the guide,
namely the guide to the climate for women in philosophy was engaged, i.e., taken up at
all.
The rhetorical dynamics of the approach
in question are well-known enough to
anyone who has read Rumpole of the
Bailey or what is just as, anyone who has
seen the BBC production starring the late
Leo Kern (Rumpole enjoys theoretical
and incidental reflections on the rhetorical
ploys of his fellow Barristers) or even and
just an old Perry Mason novel. 9

When Alcoff and Taylor and Wilkerson set up their counter lists, Leiter plus acolytes
attacked Alcoff. Thus nasty blog exchanges ensued, nicely getting Leiter in the public
eye (ah! again) and Leiter had in the interim, as noted, already and neatly shifted the
focus to Alcoff’s and Taylor’s and Wilkerson’s listing of woman friendly places to study
philosophy, which Leiter proposed to denounce as inaccurate (fairly easy to do simply
because any place can be argued to be a difficult place to be a woman in the profession
— I was participated in my first Chilly Climate for Women committee here at BC
billions of years as a grad student — and study after study has in the intervening years
has had to conclude that there are no specifically women-friendly places to study
philosophy. 10 This is because there is sexual harassment but also this is because (and
this is perhaps the most important reason, and Leiter’s attack on Alcoff, alas, bears this
out), when a woman speaks, wherever she speaks and whatever she says, thus when a
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woman does philosophy, of whatever kind she does and wherever she does philosophy,
and this does cross the analytic continental divide, she is simply not taken as seriously
as a man. 12
Women philosophers simply do not count as much which means that it is safe to attack
philosophers like Alcoff as Leiter and company did do.13 In the interim the pluralism
movement in philosophy has also happened to attract the interest of widely broad
concerns centered neither on the exclusion of continental voices or on the exclusion of
American pragmatism and its quite distinct discontents, but now focuses, as queering
philosophy, on gay and lesbian and gender/transgender issues, and race and most recently
disability. 14
I am not taking sides on this one, except to say that in my mind, SPEP has as much a
right as Brian Leiter to put a list on the web.

I actually think anyone has the right to go and put a list of anything they like on the web.

What concerns me is that Leiter for his part proceeded to issue a call for the APA, I kid
you not, to issue a recall of Linda Martín Alcoff as Vice-President, which position, as we
all know, is in effect the position of president-elect, i.e., the president to be, of the APA
itself. Note that this is an elected position which Leiter, in good legalese renames as
“quasi-elected,” kind of like the Nobel-Prize winning discovery in chemistry, of quasicrystals. But at the same time, let us take care to note that Linda Alcoff was not quasi- but
in fact legitimately, there is no quasi- about it. elected.
On Leiter’s say so, supported by means of a poll (fairly cooked in its design as folks
immediately noticed and which he subsequently shut down), the recommendation, as
addressed to the APA itself, was that Alcoff be recalled (hey, it worked for Arnold
Schwarzenegger against Gray Davis in California).

Now the APA, which has of late been having trouble keeping its own web page on line,
has other worries than what Brian Leiter proposes to tell it to do.
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But not so Linda Martín Alcoff, who, unlike the APA, is a real person. She was the
victim of Leiter’s attacks, she bore the brunt of his mockery and the mockery of his
acolytes and, this is the nature of mockery, there was nothing she could do about it,
nothing her defenders, and she has them, could do about it either.

Why is this so?

Well it is so because if I say to you that you are no good whether behind your back or to
your face, and especially if I happen to say this in public, if I say that you don’t deserve
to be vice-president of the APA, even if you happen to be Vice-President of the APA,
what exactly can you do about it?

What can you say?

I do too!
You’re wrong?

This is the beauty of calumny. Whatever you say, sheerly by saying it, the damage is
done.

This is how libel works and the reason it works has exactly nothing to do with the
rightness or the wrongness of it. 15
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To quote Lord Bacon here, audacter calumniare, semper aliquid haeret. 16 Sling mud,
something always sticks. It is one of the oldest rhetorical tricks and it is of course a
typical lawyer’s gambit.

It’s also as recent politics has made all too clear, the mainstay of political campaigning.
That’s what candidates do on TV, they attack the other guy. But this is not limited to
professional politics this rules the profession of philosophy. And if you post such attacks
in a public place, which is what we have been talking about, or if you tell students that
this so, what is the injured party going to do about it? Argue? Or just ignore it, waiting
for the defamation, the vilification to fade. The powerless and everyone, anyone attacked
in this way, is powerless, have no words to counter such attacks. It can’t be done.
This, for those who wish a philosophical account, is what Nietzsche analyzed as the
functional or working mechanics of ressentiment, there is no counter to it, and it has been
so un-utterably successful, as Nietzsche reminds us, because it cannot be countered. It is
the engine of what we think of as morals, philosophical and practical, everyday morals
today. It is what Nietzsche named The Genealogy of Morals, it is how morality comes to
be.

Continental Philosophy and Analytic Philosophy
In general (and of course this is not always true and Hegelians and Levinasians,
according to Peter Sloterdijk, at least, are noteworthy exceptions here), continental
philosophers tend, to think that analytic philosophy and all philosophic approaches
including Hegelianism, Levinasianism, and so on including Sloterdijk and Zizek and
Badiou and so on, are valid, that is to say valuable ways of doing philosophy. And
continental philosophers also tend to think one ought to hire analytically trained, analytic
philosophers to teach and write on analytic philosophy and indeed they think that one
should hire analytic philosophers and have them teach philosophy in their own
department, lets call that RIMBY, right in my backyard — rather than, say, in someone
else’s, say a neighboring school’s philosophy department.
Continental philosophers at the notoriously continental Stony Brook and BC and even
Penn State, of course, of course, all think that their philosophy departments ought to

Babette Babich: Requiem

P a g e | 10

include properly trained analytic philosophers, and so they do.17 Thus, not only do
continental philosophers hold that analytic philosophy is a viable mode of philosophy,
one that has a place in the profession and in one’s own department but empirically, in
fact, as I can reasonably attest, all the departments I have mentioned have indeed already
and for many years now hired analytic philosophers.
By contrast, analytic philosophers do not think that continental philosophy unless it
happens to be pursued in an analytic fashion, that is in analytic style, that is, in a fashion
that is up to analytic snuff, is either valid or valuable or viable as philosophy. The AP,
to use abbreviations here, thinks instead that what passes as CP should be re-defined as
pursued analytically. This may be seen in nearly any internet rant by Brian Leiter, he
speaks of those who do “serious scholarship in the Continental traditions,” i.e., “good”
continental philosophy as opposed to the “weak” or “bad” kinds of continental
philosophy (the value distinctions employed are his terms). Or one might just ask some of
my analytic colleagues about the distinction in question.
The analytic philosopher (and dominant or ruling mainstream departments bear this out in
practice, that is as can be confirmed by a look at their faculty rosters) does not think trhat
one should have traditionally formed or classically trained continental philosophers in
his (it is alas usually a his) department, however he (or she) is very willing to have
analytically trained philosophers with a continental philosophy AOS (whatever that
means and it means Stephen Mulhall or Bernard Reginster, who is a lovely man but
utterly analytic as are indeed Taylor Carmen or Manuel Delanda and so on) as those are,
per force, the only, maybe, ‘good’ continental philosophers. Thus to go with
abbreviations APs who do CP would be acceptable = CPA.
And when departments like my own at Fordham and like Stony Brook and like BC or
Penn State, just to keep to places I know something about, hire analytic philosophers they
hire people who, even if they say they support the character of the university, largely tend
to mean and to understand by that that they are down with Catholicism, say, or down with
having to be at Stony Brook or Penn State, say, and may even be very enthusiastic
Catholics or indeed state university enthusiasts (vs. fans of the private school ethos) and
so on.
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But such appointees do not (I say this in general for and of course there are exceptions)
believe that the people who are already in place, teaching continental philosophy (or
anything else) should “really” be there. As time goes on and aging helps with this, they
seek to hire more and more analytic philosophers perhaps if only in the relatively benign
hopes of blocking their view of the continental philosophers but also of course all the
other types in their departments. And ultimately this strategy does, and that is the reason
for my title, succeed.
Francis Bacon knew what he was talking about: for not only does something always stick
but after a relatively short interval, the problem resolves itself all by itself.

Crossover Cases
Where there are no teachers, there is no tradition.

When a scholar’s work is left out of scholarship by non-advertence, non-mention, be it
deliberate or accidental, here I am thinking of Nietzsche and Classics as Classics is taught
in universities all over the world, it is as if that work never existed. The results are
literally fatal for scholarship. At best one can be, as Nietzsche said, posthumous, at best,
as a later scholar to cite on exception in classical philology, Hugh Lloyd Jones, one gives
“blood to the ghosts.” But in either case we are not talking about life, here and now.

As with Brian Leiter’s conflicts with Linda Martín Alcoff, there is very little possibility
for discourse between analytic and continental philosophy because the tradition that is
committed to interpretation and translation, to generosity and curiosity and above all to
scholarship (without needing to describe such scholarship as doing “history” or some
such) will be more likely to read or make efforts to read the analytic tradition. By
definition, given the kind of program that it is, the analytic approach to philosophy does
not read and does not wish to read work in the continental tradition. At best they might
want to read so-called continental authors, the big names, but and in fact not even these.

What do analytic philosophers with a specialization in continental topics look like? Well
just to stay with Nietzsche they look like Leiter, like Reginster, like Poellner, like
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Richardson, like Schacht, like Clark who puts the program best by noting, very like
Lakatos with regard to the actual practice of science, that one can ignore most bits of
Nietzsche (this is my gloss but she says exactly this and I quote her elsewhere) to
concentrate on as Clark says, I am now glossing her directly, what is “coherent in
Nietzsche.”

What does someone who crosses the analytic-continental divide look like? Note to begin
with and this is a quasi diriment impediment, that an analytic philosopher just by reason
of his or her lack of formation, this is Nietzsche’s mangel an Philologie, cannot become
or turn into a continental philosopher.

Even a pragmatist cannot manage such a feat, hence, Rorty never became a continental
philosopher but and only and this is quite a bit Richard Rorty. Instead, just as I have
argued elsewhere, one has first to begin as a continental philosopher, for example Ernst
Tugendhat or Jacques Bouveresse. 18 Thus I recently met Lorenz Puntel, a German
systematic philosopher who is persuaded that he has turned into analytic philosopher at
the end of his life. I met him informally and for a late dinner after teaching earlier in the
day, a course on Heidegger and ending it with a lecture on technology, media, virtual
reality, reading Marcuse and Baudrillard’s The Intelligence of Evil, it is relevant to add
that the night before, I had led my graduate class in a discussion of Heidegger’s notion of
being-in as he details this in Being and Time.

I was obviously exhausted but we had a thoroughly enjoyable and very philosophical
conversation despite Puntel’s self-description as an analyst. Here I have to smile for
Puntel, however stout his self-description, couldn’t possibly be mistaken for an analyst by
an analytic or mainstream philosopher philosopher (of metaphysics or mind) if he tried,
no matter how very many or how very large or how very, very, very systematic his
books.
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Of course the characteristic of not fitting an analytic philosopher’s sense of what an
analytic philosopher looks like does not make of Puntel a continental thinker either and
despite his Bavarian origins. Thus and in a sense Puntel is indeed what someone who
bridges, who links the continental analytic tradition would look like — as is likewise
Jacques Bouveresse, just mentioned above, although it is also relevant to point out that
this observation would frustrate the two of them, albeit in different ways and for different
reasons. For and in spite of Puntel’s joke to me that he and his friends thought that France
was exactly the kind of country that was constitutionally incapable of an analytic turn, it
is the case that Bouveresse himself, and indeed both Pascal Engel and my former
colleague at Fordham, Claudine Tiercelin, among quite a few others in fact, have long
been dedicated to putting philosophy in France on the path of, to borrow from and modify
Kant: a scientism. And it is telling in fact that the dedication to analytic philosophy in
France among the power breakers has had the consequence that my former colleague,
Claudine, has indeed and as of this past June, been singled out among all other possible
candidates for the honor of being elected, and not quasi-elected either, to the College de
France.
All of France, as the French like to say, meaning only the philosophy professors and
those interested in philosophy, were baffled because and to an extent Puntel is right, they
could not fathom what she was talking about, with all their background in philosophy,
they did not recognize her topics. 19 But the point is not to connect with the tradition of
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philosophy in France, as Bouveresse gave the press to understand in no uncertain terms, 20
but to participate in a globally dominant movement, that is analytic philosophy, however
much that also happens to be an Anglo-Saxon tradition. But the nomination and election
of Claudine Tiercelin to the College de France demonstrates (had it needed demonstration
after the massive success of Sokal’s and Bricmont’s Intellectual Imposters), that analytic
philosophy reigns in Europe just as much as it does in the United States. Only the
theological turn in France, the one that gave my friend Dominique Janicaud a heart attack
of the spirit to go with the heart attack he suffered in body, and all because of what it
meant about a particular constriction, as Janicaud regarded it, of phenomenology in
France.
Puntel was delighted to argue in conversation, notice this because I did, and he continued
the Carnap tradition, as we may call it, of mocking Heidegger for inconsistency or
triviality — tautology is the word here — that Heidegger’s focus on finitude already
presupposed the non-finite, the infinite. This is a nicely Heideggerian move, of course,
for where Descartes, as we all recall, pointed to the impossibility of accretionary finitudes
(as it were) generating a positive infinity (but and merely a very large but finite array),
the idea for Heidegger would be the pretheoretical, preconceptual move, one already
assumes infinity, it is just that given that Descartes says it is. Thus if Heidegger told
Puntel and my friend who now divides his time with his wife Anke Bennholdt-Thomsen
between Berlin and Greece, Lev Guzzoni who happened to be the editor of Time and
Being that the charge is to think finitude, Heidegger is claiming something that his own
argument disallows, literally and in advance.
But, of course, Heidegger is not dictating or claiming that what is is only Endlichkeit,
finitude. Exactly not and this is the continental move, and this is why Puntel is not a
continental philosopher and my teacher Gadamer always emphasized a generosity of
intellect, in addition to the important spin this gives to the notion that understanding is
always understanding otherwise, verstehen ist immer anders verstehen. For Gadamer,
who was the one and only reason I came to Boston College in the first place, as for
Heidegger as for Nietzsche there is instead a recognition that this is one way, there are
other ways, there is always more to be thought.
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To borrow the line that Heidegger, for his part, takes over from Hölderlin (if indeed and
in order to read Rilke), now speaking not of finitude but mortality, Sterblichkeit — deity
in the sense of whatever divinities there are, and Hölderlin tells us that they have fled the
world, and as he names them in his Bread and Wine we recognize them all as sons who
cross over, who join, who translate, who transcend another divide: the limits between the
divine and the mortal as he also names them: every one of them a bastard god of a kind:
Herakles, Dionysos, Christ. The first two identical as sons of the Olympian father, Zeus,
and Heidegger catches Nietzsche’s echo of the same, speaking of the play of the world
Hero, Demi-god, God, and Christ of course, son of God, son of man.
That in turn is nothing but the mystery of what Nietzsche calls the body, of blood, of
flesh itself, the incarnation, as Hölderlin, who refused all of his life to be a priest as he
was trained to be one, and of course, never did anything but priestly things in all that he
did, what mortals do is turn, what mortals do, they can do because they are hung, as they
are, over an abyss.
Nietzsche

and

Hölderlin

take

these

reflections to a reflection not on the
indigence of the mortal, for this is
Endlichkeit

not

Sterblichkeit,

but

the

indigence of the divine and to ask what
Nietzsche names the most painful question
of what such a god knows about love.
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To go further here would take us in another direction. For the moment, it is enough to
observe that Heidegger is neither contradicting himself nor is he is inconsistent. What he
is doing when he suggests that we are to think the finitude of finitude, to think the limit of
the limit as of the limitless, the edge of being on the edge as mortal beings, as created
being, as of uncreated being, the risk or the wager that intrigues Rilke but is for
Heidegger still not enough about what this finitude means, just in the horizonal context of
time and being. And so too Being, and so too, obliquely indeed time. But what is asked
for there is not a sentence, not a proposition, not a claim, but thinking and that is of
course, always caught up with questioning reflection. And to see that we need, this is the
continental move for me, to cut Heidegger a break.
How might what he says make sense, what sense does it have for him, how can it be
made to make sense for us. In what sense? And here we pay attention to style and to go
with style, we listen to the tone.

This is also for me the harder way to go about philosophy. I have seen dozens and
dozens of EZ ways, “refutations” of Heidegger, finishing him off nicely, just as I have
seen numerous instaurations of EZ Nietzsche, what I call the sophomore’s because it
requires so very little in the way of prerequisites, refutation of Nietzsche. As it is argued:
Nietzsche simply contradicts himself: hey, so the “argument” goes, Nietzsche claims as
true, can you believe it, that there is no truth. Indeed, but and as Nietzsche says, that
would be the point: begin there, think there.
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What follows if we assume that there is no truth, if indeed we assume that truth is a
woman, inconstant? Here we might remember the point of John Donne’s poem, Song.

And sexist as it is — and it is precisely
sexist — Donne’s poem is all about the
impossibility of finding a woman “true
and fair” — and nothing at all about the
impossibility of finding a man of the
same character, caliber, qualities.
Here, along with Nietzsche’s inconstant
lady Truth, we ask the ontological
question what if, we ask what follows if there is no truth, rather than basking in the
“hypothesis of the simple,” as Baudrillard calls it? And as Baudrillard knew, such a
question needs to be asked today, just given the ontological sea change that is the virtual
or let us now call it “digital” — it is the same but we prefer one word to another from
time to time — these are the fashions of mind, adumbration of everything we know and
everything we see and hear. The adventure of thinking such things belongs to continental
philosophy, classically, that always means, broadly conceived.

Some recent young interviewers got my attention by reminding me (and thus I here fulfill
one promise made at the start of my talk), that I had claimed (and I should say here that I
stand by the analogy), that analytic philosophy “ ...stands to science as scholastic
philosophy once did to theology.” I stand by this and plan to come back to it below, but
they moved not to the context of that discussion of analytic philosophy but to my claim
that
Continental philosophy differs from analytic philosophy in its openness to
questioning which also means that it is less concerned with solutions than it is
with critical questioning (including the question of its own presumptions or
prejudices). But this focus on critical questioning also means, at least ideally,
that continental philosophy does not aspire to take its rational warrant from
science itself.
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The question these young students went on to ask bears directly on the theme of today’s
graduate workshop: “Nearly a decade on, there remains heated discussion about this
‘analytic/continental divide. What is the usefulness of this term and its possible future?”
Great question, if a bit over-familiar to us by now.
There are two points to be made here. Firstly, what my interlocutors left out was prepared
in the context of my article, where I emphasize that analytic philosophy is as the Germans
say, zurechtgenannt, justifiably so named: it is dedicated to dissolving itself and its
heritage (that means your department of philosophy if we drop from the heights of theory
to the saw of university budget cuts). In other words, the program, and I am only
borrowing from mainstream philosophy when I say this, is to resolve problems, to
dispose of problems, clear up difficulties, eliminate questions. End of story.
And this is someone else’s requiem.
To the second point, which was what I addressed in my reply, I argued that popular
treatments of the debate usually tended to want to deny its very existence. And I can give
you footnote after footnote to justify this point.
But consider the question of the question as posed, just because when one speaks of “the
“usefulness of this term” as my young questioners, they were undergraduates, did do,
they too seemed to be pointing in the direction of popularity and its values. Thus it is
most “useful” to pretend (here the Brian Leiter-report and associated blogs are good
instantiations of this particular “use” or desire as nerdish wish fulfillment) that scholars
such as those whose work one does not like can be not merely ignored, or simply not
cited, this is the ostrich effect, but and ultimately “designated” out of existence.
This is old hat in academia, which has always been a competitive arena (going as far back
as Heraclitus who recommended junking everyone else but himself) and it’s also
emblematic of the modern, thus we hear the trope at the penultimate level of Nietzsche’s
short “History of an Error,” which is more about the natural history of what Bill
Richardson after Heidegger calls errancy and illusion than it is what it appears to be,
namely an account of the difference between the “real” world (which originally of course
meant the ideal world) and the apparent, the “phenomenal” world where Nietzsche writes
that that “real” (ideal) world is:
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— an idea no longer of any use …— an idea grown useless, superfluous,
consequently, a refuted idea: let us abolish it! (Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols,
How the Real World at Last Became a Myth)
It goes without saying that abolishing “an idea grown useless” is inherently risky not for
reasons of, say, reverential regard but both logically and effectively or practically or
really because the supererogatory is not therefore or thereby “refuted.”
Occam’s razor is a principle of
convenience not demonstration:
it is not a matter of ontology
(though it can become one). In
the case of Nietzsche’s particular
example, if we proceed to
abolish

the

so-called

“real

world” what we find, whether
we will this result or not is that
“we have also abolished the
apparent world.” (Ibid.) The case
of the real and the apparent turn out to be, as many things are in context, a case of corelevant concepts. Nietzsche’s joke is in the rhetorical array: it because the idea may be
said to be “useless” that one supposes that one may do away with it: because it is
“superfluous,” one concludes that it has, as a result, been “refuted.”
And why ever not get rid of the
distinction? Especially where there are
fewer

and

fewer

continental

philosophers — even in traditionally
“continental” philosophy departments?
More than one person has told me
(obviously not in print or they would
have had to cite the text) that one of the
more compelling points in my article as

Babette Babich: Requiem

P a g e | 20

quoted from Carlos Prado’s A House Divided, 22 is that I bring the closed-off, and
perversely and inherently self-immolating character of analytic style philosophy into
relief. I emphasize that and by contrast with Nietzsche and Heidegger, contemporary
analytic philosophy isn’t open to questioning. It is closed not because I say so but on its
own terms. Thus I describe traditional continental philosophy in its critically hermeneutic
and reflectively phenomenological character as the practice of intensifying questions —
making them even worse as I like to put it.
Here, I follow Heidegger, who follows Nietzsche: the point of philosophy is not as Karl
Popper has claimed, to solve problems but to make them still more problematic.
I go on to contrast this with analytic philosophy’s ongoing passion for deflating,
puncturing, or otherwise dissolving questions, here, again, just to use the rhetoric of the
mainstream.
It is a common place in analytic philosophy to dismiss questions and whole traditions of
philosophical problems altogether by “unmasking” them as not (really) “real” questions,
declaring them pseudo-questions.

In this sense, analytic or mainstream philosophy

regards its task as the solving of problems, dissolving all other problems and issues as
irrelevant, as pseudo-problems.
Similarly, as we have seen, analytic philosophy adjudges, evaluates, rates continentally
trained philosophers as “poor,” or “weak,” or “bad” philosophers, who are thus similarly
unmasked as not really being philosophers, after all, certainly not ones who should have
appointments, speak at conferences, or hold office at the highest level in the profession.
In the same way that continental philosophy as such describes a philosophical style and is
thus otherwise than a description of philosophy as currently, say. practiced on the
continent, 23 analytic philosophy which is not accidentally also called “mainstream”
philosophy and which we may thus refer to as received philosophy, i.e., as the dominant
tradition in the profession, is itself and likewise a style, referring to be sure, to more than
one kind and thus not referring only to a single or specific method or indeed, to bring
geography into the mix, a particular locus.
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If one asks whether it is ‘useful’ to distinguish between maintaining and dissolving
problems, perhaps simply by stipulating them as solved or else by declaring them useless
or meaningless, as so many distinctions to be “abolished,” one thereby purposes or
intends to eliminate what is problematic: as a consequence one gets to dismiss those who
present or maintain such problems.
And that turns out to be the point.
This is what makes the focus on what may be designated as ‘useful’ or ‘efficient’ so very
expeditious (and not just in ways that the economist Lester Thurow once argued). And it
is done by the difference-quashing power of the first person plural. One says (note the
neutralized first person): “we” don’t need to talk about continental and analytic
philosophy any longer, “we” don’t find the distinction “useful.”
But such a way of speaking has its own utility and the result of that is a patently
monolithic conception of philosophy.
My worry in response has always been, firstly, that philosophy is all about making
distinctions. 24 “I’ll teach you differences,” says Wittgenstein, himself quoting
Shakespeare or would that be Lord Bacon again, in his turn.
Secondly, and this has been the sideline focus of my talk all along, I am struck by how
self-serving such claims tend to be. When I first wrote on this topic in 1991, not ten
years ago as my optimistic undergraduate interlocutors but twenty years ago and I first
learned of the distinction a decade before then in 1980 when Rorty gave his own
presidential address at the APA, I noticed that when authors claimed as they did in book
after book on the post- this or post- that “turn” in analytic philosophy, the same authors
always went on to point out how very advanced analytic philosophy was, how openminded it was, and so on but I also noted that such books tended almost without
exception to use such claims as the basis for excluding or limiting not encouraging
dialogue, conversation, exchange.
Hence If one wanted to talk, as one of my teachers did, about Husserl and Heisenberg in
the philosophy of science, or about Nietzsche and about Heidegger in the philosophy of
science as I did, one met closed doors: there was and is no dialogue, no conversation,
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certainly no exchange. And as I noted at the start, I am now come back to that point as I
promised when it comes to the profession simple non-mention, not quoting people, that is
utter exclusion, is far more efficient than refutation.
It does not seem to me that claiming that the distinction isn’t ‘useful’ or that it is
‘meaningless’ is terrifically different.

The purpose to be served is exclusion.

We all already know all that, say the powers that be, but analytic philosophy
isn’t that way at all, it has changed, analytic philosophy is now so various and
so new, hence it is, as my colleagues at Fordham will tell me, that there are so
many “different” kinds of philosophy of mind and analytic metaphysics and so
on, the logic of which adverting to such proliferation of kinds and kinds
translates in effect to saying ‘we need to hire more people to do analytic
metaphysics or philosophy of mind: don’t talk to us about your concerns,
about the kinds of things you do, we’re not interested, we don’t want to hear
from you, we don’t want to hear from those like you, we already know what
you have to say. And besides: we don’t ‘understand it.’
‘Instead of engaging in dialogue, instead of talking about has been done in
your tradition or about your research interests, what you ought to do is listen
to us. Rather than exchange and conversation: it is just and only analytic
philosophy that should be read, you should hire scholars trained in analytic
philosophy who do so-called ‘continental’ work, you ought to dialogue with
analytic philosophers only, converse solely on our topics, using only our
terminology and style. Because that is what philosophy ought to be.
It seems to me that this only serves the purpose of enshrining one particular style of doing
philosophy which one designates as “good” philosophy, as the only style of philosophy.
And this is the effect whenever one says, as many younger scholars who also describe
themselves as “continental” (in good analytic fashion, let it be noted) and despite an

Babette Babich: Requiem

P a g e | 23

analytic formation (that means: their training, their background, their reading), let’s just
not perpetuate such distinctions, but let’s talk instead of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ philosophy.

The problem is that what counts as good and what counts as bad always turns out to be
just those kinds of philosophy defined from the perspective and on the standards of that
same analytic formation.

Let’s go back a bit to Nietzsche. He claims he is the first to raise the question of science
as a question and he also raises the related question of truth. He questions causality along
with our presuppositions about the very idea of cause and very fundamentally indeed, he
raises the question of the origin of logic itself, in logical and on historical terms (and in
the case of the last he reminds us of the oddity of our universal conviction that we can
proceed from non-knowledge to knowledge, transition from error to truth, and in general
and thereby manage to advance from mythic thought and convention to logical and
rational thinking.
How, Nietzsche asks, does that work? How can one ever, logically speaking, begin with
error and proceed to truth?
If we begin with superstition and ignorance, that’d be the cavemen, exactly how do we
progress to enlightenment and knowledge? Everything in what Nietzsche writes on this
question depends upon the question of foundation and Nietzsche asks the ultimate
question of ground.
Logic conserves or preserves what truth one has to begin with. Reasoning logically, we
do not deviate from correct insights, whereas illogical process leaves us anywhere and
everywhere, even when our premises are true.
The problem for Nietzsche and for Heidegger, as for Kant, Hume, Descartes, this is a
traditional problem, is to find a secure foundation.
But today philosophers no longer worry about such a so-called crisis of foundations as
concerned Nietzsche and Husserl and Heidegger, and they do not worry because science
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is our mighty fortress, our foundation. Thus we take what science says as our point of
departure for philosophy: we take ‘as true’ whatever science says is true.
And maybe it is true, that is not my point here, but rather and just that philosophy, even
the philosophy of science, does not and I have argued elsewhere that I think that it
should, 25 pose critical questions to science or indeed for the sake of science, as I hold that
Heidegger also argues.
To return as I promised, to the parallel cited above, where scholastic philosophy once
served theology and where theology very conscientiously, even anxiously required the
services of philosophy (even if this anxiety tended to lead to an ultimate movement to
“deny reason” in order, as it were, to make room “for faith”), today’s science does not
similarly stand in need of philosophy’s contributions quite irrespective (and this is why I
pay attention to this) of whether those contributions happen to be analytic or continental.
This sovereignty, autonomy, or disinterest on the part of modern science, those would be
one’s colleagues in the natural science departments, those would be the folk at CERN,
people working on stem cells (provided they don’t have to pass an ethics review board
regarding their experimental plans), is particularly problematic for the dominant mode of
philosophizing, that is, analytic philosophy in particular, just to the extent that it
embraces science as its model, or ideal.
Here we note again that for its part, traditional philosophy never ‘embraced’ scholastic
theology (per impossibile, in the case of Plato and Aristotle never mind the Pre-Socratics)
as its ideal.
Once again: analytic philosophy embraces an enterprise, that would be the natural
sciences, that for its own part does not require its services --- although and of course,
unwanted attentions also happens to define not a lovers’ but a stalkers’ relationship.
Such an attempted embrace of science does not characterize the critical, continental kind
of philosophy of science, that, like Nietzsche’s as I have argued, does not model itself on
science and does not aspire to be taken “as” science but instead and much rather seeks to
put science itself in question.
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In this way and although analytic philosophy emphasizes what is called ‘critical
thinking,’ there is a radical avoidance of critique especially where it concerns science and
I have noted that I have always found this problematic for the philosophy of science in
particular. I have some small comfort, though it may not comfort him to have me cite him
here, that the perfectly analytic British philosopher, P.M.S. Hacker makes a similar
point. 26

If analytic philosophy does not question science, science in turn as I have noted does not
regard philosophy, no matter whether analytic or continental, as theology once regarded
philosophy. This is where a certain pathos, already described as philosophical stalking
rather than philosophical cruising, say, comes in. For it is not the case that science gives
a hoot about the distinctions between philosophical kinds that we are talking about here.
And accordingly, when it comes to the relevance of the philosophy of science of any
flavor (be it analytic or continental), for “practical scientific endeavors” just to refer to
the work of contemporary scientists, science proceeds without referring to philosophy of
any stripe.
Thus although analytic philosophers of science may regard what they write as having
more significance to practical scientific endeavors (as opposed, say, to Nietzsche’s
philosophy of science), the scientists themselves do not depend upon philosophy of any
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kind and are, it would appear, universally united in not taking it to be particularly
significant for their own practice.
And indeed that has always been true. If Quine could say as he did that mathematics is
philosophy enough, the physicists, and this is why Nietzsche addresses himself directly to
the physicists (“my dear Messieurs Physicist,” he writes), might counter that physics is
philosophy enough. If yesterday’s scientist, scientists like Heisenberg and like Einstein
and like Neurath and like Bohr and Schrödinger, and so on, enjoyed a background that
included philosophy in addition to classical studies, this background did not mean that
they revered the philosophers of science of their day.
The scientists just named all from the era of the late 19th and early to mid-20th century,
always held themselves perfectly capable of philosophizing all by themselves — and
many of them did just that. They did not need to and they did not in fact appeal to their
colleagues in philosophy to help them out.
Let me note further that analytic philosophers, especially analytic philosophers of
science, especially the cognitive sciences, are not at all sanguine about this state of affairs
and they often undertake to do whatever they can to get scientists to pay attention to
them. Hence it is precisely analytic philosophy — and precisely to the extent that it very
deliberately patterns itself on science — that is concerned to persuade science to take its
efforts seriously, to find its efforts “useful,” there’s that word again, and so on. This may
well be behind the recent turn to empirical philosophy, which is philosophy by survey
(think of Leiter’s poll), an amusing ennobling of the appeal that is called the argumentum
ad populum (and which is, of course, a textbook fallacy). 27
Even if this move turns out to be successful, this turn will at best make of philosophy a
social science, and we ought not to forget that the social sciences themselves have their
own anxieties about presenting themselves as sciences. In place of 19th century method,
we have 20th (and so far or to date 21st) century quantificational analysis.

In short, I don’t think analytic philosophers have had much success persuading the
scientists per se that they need analytic philosophy.
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But and this is the key, analytic philosophers by claiming to speak for the scientists, have
had success in persuading university deans that they in fact represent the sciences. I don’t
know how long this will last, thinking of the mindset of administrators it might last
forever, but I have often thought that if there are, as indeed there are, many universities
that host Departments of Cognitive Science along with Departments of Linguistics and
Departments of Neuroscience as well as Departments of Cognitive Psychology,
Departments of Robotics, and so on, that a Department of Philosophy taken as translator
of the sciences to the sciences, might well seem to be redundant or unnecessary,
assuming, as I assume, a competent faculty in the aforenamed disciplines, all of whom
can teach what analytic philosophers regard as ‘critical thinking’ and all of whom know
the sciences to which analytic philosophers appeal (say, regarding brain states) far better
than the philosophers themselves.
Unlike theology that conscientiously drew upon philosophy, science faculty are well able
to explain their own ways to themselves and to students and others and do not need such
handmaidens or (ancillae).

Perhaps it might be useful to replace departments of analytic philosophy, dedicated as
many are today to a kind of simplified science literacy (and not the critical analysis of
science, as that last has died the death of the so-called “strong” or Edinburgh program of
the sociology of science along with the evaporation of the anthropology of science into
actor network analysis), and to the celebration of what it takes to be the content of
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science, with real science studies programs that would teach stock or standard accounts of
the aims of science to the general public.
This issue is not the same for continental philosophy which for the most part and because
it is less and less what it used to be and more and more what analytic philosophy has left
over for it to be, means that most continental philosophy dutifully avoids reflection on
science like the plague. This is not the case for continental philosophy of science but, as
if I needed to emphasize this once again, that is a very small subfield.

I’m going to conclude by returning once more to the interview with the undergraduate
editors of the new journal Purlieu, as they quoted Mario Bunge as “one of the many
authors thinking about the ‘crisis of philosophy.” Bunge’s claim as he writes in
Philosophy in Crisis: The Need for Reconstruction is that “all the philosophical schools
are in ruins.”
What they asked me did I think.
And this is the sort of question that causes me to cringe. One’s colleague has said X, what
does one think about X?
I cringed in part because and in fact I agree, just empirically, with Bunge, although and of
course I do not agree with him for his reasons (Bunge is strongly anti-hermeneutic) yet I
too believe that things are as bad from his point of view as they are from mine.
For my own part, agreeing as I do that “all” the schools of philosophy are in “ruins,” I
hold little hope that it is possible to reconstruct or rebuild or start anew. That is the
reason for my title.
Once one loses the teachers (and we have lost them, not all but most), it is not just hard, it
is impossible to proceed with what deserves the name of philosophy. Here although I
would say that most of the great minds are lost and I would also say, with apologies all
around, that those who take their place are not, just to say this politely, as great, it
remains the case that we still have to proceed as best we can.
I end this essay as honestly and as practically and as politically as I began it.
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The trouble as I see it is that those who now occupy positions of prestige (here we are
back to our original reference to standards and the ‘rigor’ of the profession) are, as newer
scholars also are, as mediocre as they tend to be. For me, this only means that they are
poorly trained and ill read, and these, my younger colleagues, become angry examples of
what Nietzsche called ressentiment if this is suggested, and I cannot do otherwise than
suggest it.
This is also what Nietzsche meant when he talked about getting oneself an “educator,”
which is to say, doing what it takes (that means reading and more reading) to acquire an
“education” or a “culture,” and it should go without saying that Nietzsche’s standards
were much higher than mine could possibly be, just given my own inevitable limitations
compared with Nietzsche. This is what Isaac Newton also meant when he talked about
the giants of a past intellectual formation. 28 It is simply mind-blowing what people once
knew and we do not (notice that we always think we know more), and perhaps as the
Google project of the decimation of books continues and university libraries proceed,
with the sanction of professors on library committees, to cut book budgets and to discard
large parts of their collections.
This is a kind of digital snow-blindnesss.
I would point out that, and I blame myself as well, although I did my damndest, albeit
without success, that it is today’s philosophy professors who have presided over the
current state of the profession. Bunge himself is to blame; I am to blame. Of course
Bunge has had vastly more power and influence than I have had (this is easy to claim
because I have had almost no influence), and his failures are for those reasons far more
significant than mine just because I am not as important as he is.
There is no doubt in my mind that Bunge has read not a word written by continental
philosophers of science. 29 By contrast I have, of course (of course I say: of course) read
Bunge (and many, many others). Analytic philosophers of science take themselves to be
reading continental philosophy of science if they read Foucault — just as analytic
philosophers take themselves to be continental if they read, say Heidegger or Nietzsche.
What they do not do is read those traditionally continental authors or even very many
analytic authors who write on Foucault, Heidegger, Nietzsche. And yet by discounting
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the broader array of philosophy and of philosophical authors and commentators, analytic
philosophy has painted itself into its own smaller and smaller corner.
What is most regrettable perhaps is that at this point there seems to be no robust
alternative. Thus it is that today in most departments of philosophy there is no other style
of philosophy than the analytic kind. Analytic philosophy has had the power in the
academy (and it takes the power because it is a tradition of entitlement and not mutuality)
and the result of its dominion has been an impoverishment of philosophy. 30
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he does that Aristotle’s own method proceeds by ‘clarifying’ what his predecessors confusedly knew.
See Sokolowski, “The Method of Philosophy: Making Distinctions,” The Review of Metaphysics, Vol.
51, No. 3 (Mar., 1998): 515-532. Prior to Sokowlowski, see too Hannah Arendt’s letter entitled
“Distinctions” which she sent to New York Review of Books, Volume 13, Number 12 (January 1, 1970)
in reply to a review published on her book, Men in Dark Times. Although by her own self-assessment,
a political theorist rather than a philosopher, Arendt draws upon her clearly philosophical background
to argue against her reviewer that “the point at issue is not the past but tradition, and the distinction
between them: Tradition orders the past, hands it down (tradere), interprets it, omits, selects, and
emphasizes according to a system of pre-established beliefs. Tradition is a mental construct and as
such always subject to critical examination. If I say that no tradition can claim validity today, I do not
say that the past is dead but that we have no reliable guide through it any more, from which it follows
that tradition itself has become a part of the past.” Ibid.
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See Babich, “Towards a Critical Philosophy of Science: Continental Beginnings and Bugbears, Whigs
and Waterbears,” International Journal of the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 24, No. 4 (December 2010):
343-391.
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See “‘Hacker’s Challenge’ James Garvey interviews P.M. S. Hacker,” TPM, The Philosopher’s
Magazine, Issue 51 ( October 25, 2010).
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I am sure that Michael Wreen, who argues nicely that fallacies typically regarded are only qualifiedly
so, would be comparably enlightening on the matter of this traditional informal fallacy. I cite Wreen
(and others) in Babich, “Towards a Critical Philosophy of Science.”
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Read Principe’s book just for the philosophical frisson of the first few pages, and read the rest for its
own sake (not to mention for useful bits on Newton). See text indicated in above note for citation
details.
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Being unread is, of course, what it means to be non-influential, that is why I discussed the elusive
quality of the readerly public above.
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This concluding word would be used for the title of an interview: Babich, “An Impoverishment of
Philosophy” in: Dennis Erwin and Matt Story, eds., Purlieu: Philosophy and the University (2011): 37-71.

